Note: If you haven’t read the first four articles in this series, please do so. We are in the midst of a cumulative argument about literalism within biblical hermeneutics and the best way to understand and practice interpreting the Bible.
I have attempted to lay out the argument that Spinoza’s literalism is incompatible with Christianity, but this leads us to the difficulty that a large group of Christians promote a system of hermeneutics which has the appearance of being identical to the Epicurean belief policy. Their definition of literalism, “interpretation that gives to every word the same meaning it would have in normal usage, whether employed in writing, speaking or thinking” [Charles Ryrie, Dispensationalism: Revised and Updated (Chicago: Moody Press, 2007), 91], sounds very much like Spinoza’s.
The above quote comes from Charles Ryrie, an august proponent of a doctrinal system called Dispensationalism. He holds two secular academic degrees, including a Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh. He is a sophisticated and academic defender who has written a Dispensational systematic theology—Basic Theology. Obviously, godly Dispensationalists are not Epicureans, and it would be a gross injustice to call them such—especially, given their contribution in maintaining the gospel against encroaching modernity in the last century. Let’s see if we can’t clarify the situation.
Dispensationalism as a system is a relative newcomer to theology, dating from about the 1840s with some of its unique components beginning to appear on the historical horizons in the mid-1700s. (By theology, I mean a systematic understanding of the biblical canon.) It is different from Catholic, Lutheran, or Reformed theology in that its proponents are united around an understanding of the end times, but not around their understanding of salvation, and polity.
Our interest is in the interpretive belief policy of literalism as basic to the system. Ryrie lists out three fundamental characteristics of Dispensationalism: (1)Israel and the Church are kept distinct, and (2)“This distinction between Israel and the church is born out of a system of hermeneutics that is usually called literal interpretation,” Dispensationalism: Revised and Updated (Chicago: Moody Press, 2007), 47, original italicized. Ryrie also holds as a fundamental distinction (3) “the glory of God,” but he has confused his hoped for outcome with the system itself.
Let’s trace out the contours of Ryrie’s definition of literalism with some examples to help us understand his meaning: “The prophecies in the Old Testament concerning the first coming of Christ—His birth, His rearing, His ministry, His death, His resurrection—were all fulfilled literally” Ibid, 92. Ryrie provides us a clear example to test his definition of literalism: all of the prophecies concerning the first coming of Christ “were all fulfilled literally.”
Here is one such text, Genesis 3:15: “I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and her offspring; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel.” Ryrie states, “An individual from the woman’s seed (Jesus Christ) will deal a death blow to Satan’s head at the cross while Satan will cause Christ to suffer (‘bruise his heel’),” Basic Theology (Wheaton: Victor Books, 1986), 205.
As far as I am able to ascertain, there is not a single point of this prophecy which Ryrie “gives to every word the same meaning it would have in normal usage, whether employed in writing, speaking or thinking.” Satan being sent to hell is read into “bruise your head,” and Christ’s suffering on the cross is read into “bruise his heel.” The word serpent in the wider context is read as Satan, and “her offspring” is read as Jesus Christ. These readings can be defended on figurative and typological grounds, but not on any form of literal or normal readings.
Genesis 3 is a particularly helpful test case, because the apostles never comment directly on its fulfillment. Ryrie’s interpretation is then developed only from his own hermeneutic and not from apostolic comment. When one begins to consider the apostles’ non-literal fulfillments, examples of typological and figurative interpretations can be multiplied (Matt. 2:15 compared to Hos. 11:1; Gal. 3:13 compared to Deut. 21:22-23, et cetera).
Ryrie expands his definition with a quote from J. P. Lange:
The literalist (so called) is not one who denies that figurative language, that symbols, are used in prophecy, nor does he deny that great spiritual truths are set forth therein: his position is, simply, that the prophecies are to be normally interpreted (i.e., according to the received laws of language) as any other utterance are interpreted—that which is manifestly figurative being so regarded, Dispensationalism, 92.
We must draw from this that what “normal” means is a careful collation of all the data of the Bible to discern the intent of God in his use of symbolic, literal, and typological language. The different usages of words can be harmonized because while there are many human authors, God coordinates and inspires the activity. If this is what is intended, Ryrie’s hermeneutic is essentially identical to Augustine or John Owen—neither of which were Dispensationalists.
And so let’s expand his definition by what he believes is the necessary outcome of his hermeneutics: “The nonliteralist is the nonpremillennialist, the less specific and less consistent literalists are covenant premillennialist and the progressive dispensationalist, and the consistent literalist is a dispensationalist,” (102).
What becomes apparent from the above is that “literalism” is the theological outcome of Dispensationalism. If a hermeneutical system does not come to Dispensational outcomes, than it’s not literalism. The practical consequence of this is that Ryrie’s literalism might best be defined as any orthodox interpretation of the Bible that maintains Dispensationalism. But most importantly, the definition of literalism is suddenly limited to Dispensational outcomes.
It is readily apparent that Spinoza and Ryrie are claiming the same basic hermeneutical system, and I hope that it is equally obvious that Ryrie is not a materialist, and certainly not a literalist in the sense that Spinoza was. He’s not an Epicurean because he believes in the God revealed by the Bible—Trinitarian, personal, separate from creation, and self-consciously revealing himself through nature and the Bible. And Ryrie is not going to violate these beliefs which Augustine called the “universal faith” in any interpretation.
So why do Ryrie and Spinoza formulate their interpretive belief policies in the same way? Rhetorical advantage and habits of mind must play a part: literal and normal carry beneficial connotations in Ryrie’s thought and in the circle of Christians which he is most comfortable speaking. Literal and normal sound like wonderful tools to cut through the knots of un-fulfilled and fulfilled prophecy and rising materialism in the Church; but pressing the provided definitions leads to something like “interpretations that come to the same conclusions that I hold to about the end times.” Literal and normal hermeneutics then take their place with words like authentic, relevant, freedom, democracy, love, and the like—big positive concepts without much intrinsic significance.
My suspicion is that the rhetorical advantages of the term literal and normal occur among Christians because of their introduction in the Bible conference circuit in the 1850s. This was combined with a misstep by Christian apologists in response to the rising Epicureanism by “common sense” or “normal” interpretations of the world and the word (cf. Shedd, “The Nature, and Influence, of the Historic Spirit,” Theological Essays). The common sense response was certainly healthier for the Church than what became known as Christian liberalism, and often more edifying than even more modern Christian responses, but normal simply doesn’t go deep enough. It shored up the Church but was and is not robust enough to withstand the caustic literalism of the Epicureans, nor coherent and satisfying to many godly Christians.
So let’s come back to what Ryrie calls the sine qua non of Dispensationalism. What he apparently means by “literal interpretation” is an interpretation of the Bible that holds to orthodox beliefs and keeps Israel and the Church distinct. In other words, the separation of Israel and the Church is a primary belief policy in the Dispensational interpretive system. And it’s a potentially valid presupposition that works itself out as Dispensational theology with a mixture of literal and typological interpretations and historical orthodoxy.
The issue is that all theological outcomes are dependent on some primary belief polices. Similar interpretive policies lead to similar outcomes. The tension that arises in the conversation about what the Bible means is the almost universal habit of the human mind for the hermeneutical belief policies to become ingrained in other theological conclusions as non-articulated assumptions. The interpretive belief policy seems so true its origin and coherence are not questioned.
While the thoughtful proponents of a view, say a Spinoza, come to the conclusion that God is not personal and interprets the Bible literally, it is doubtful that the average neo-atheist is aware of this when he brings up the problem of evil—an argument that takes God’s benevolence “literally.” The atheist accepts Spinoza’s interpretive system of mere materialism and goes his way. A similar event occurs in the Church; most Calvinists have not worked out proof texts for the compatibility of God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility, nor Arminians their egalitarian definition of love and libertarian free will. Each one of these interpretive belief policies is theoretically possible, but for them to be validated, the underlying framework must be exposed, proven and supported by Scripture and reason.
So let’s gather our conclusion: rhetorically Ryrie claims to be literalist, but he’s defining literalism as an interpretive system that supports Israel and the Church being kept separate. He allows and promotes prophecy being interpreted typologically as long as the distinction between Israel and the Church is maintained (see his interpretation of Genesis 3 above). With the exception of the Israel/Church distinction, he is following Augustine’s general outline for hermeneutics and rejecting Spinoza’s view.
Next month we will draw together our conclusions on the “problem of literalism.”