William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980, 484 pgs.
Summary: A brilliant overview and critique of the philosophical description of hermeneutics from Heidegger (cf. review s.v.), Gadamer (1900-2002), and Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Thiselton includes brief overviews of Kant and the secondary writers that influenced the authors. He also reviews the work of the major interpreters—critical and admiring—with a close summary and critique of Bultmann (1884-1976) as the most public synthesizer of Heidegger’s thought. The theologian Panneberg (1928- ) tends to reside in the background providing Thiselton his epistemological foundation. Thiselton then argues for the acceptance of portions of Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s insights as corrected by Panneneberg, Gadamer, and others as a part of New Testament hermeneutics.
From Heidegger he draws the recognition that the writers of the Bible had different horizons from ours and that we must be aware of the horizons or pre-understandings and the authors’ as we approach the text. Panneneberg’s insight that the part cannot be known separately from the whole allows Thiselton to avoid the passive relativism of Heidegger. He clearly finds Wittgenstein’s descriptions more useful in Christian hermeneutics than Heidegger.
The most important insight that he draws from Wittgenstein is considering the “logical grammar of a concept” (386, italics in original). Logical grammar occurs in three classes. Class one are universals: it is always the case that A=A and Romans 4:4, “Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due.” Class two are statements that are “a foundation for research and action” (392, italics in original) and they are rarely questioned by those within a particular language context. These are the hinges, nails, or “the scaffolding of our thoughts” (ibid). And can be illustrated by Hebrews 6:18, “it is impossible for God to lie.”
Finally, class three which are “linguistic recommendations, pictures, and paradigms” (401). “[T]hey concern the elucidation and the application of concepts, and are not statements about the world” (Ibid, italics in original). Contextual class three statements also turn on “institutional facts” (402), such as God’s relationship with Abraham as revealed in the Bible and assumed by Paul in Galatians 3:7. These statements also provide the picture or our attitudes towards the thing being discussed. The pictures essentially function as the orientation of thought towards something and includes attitude—for instance, Muslims’ picture of Crusaders, Communist of the middle class, the middleclass towards Bolsheviks.
As we study the text of the Bible, the three classes allow us to consider the difference between James 2:24, “You see that a person is justified by works and not by faith alone,” and Romans 3:28, “For we hold that one is justified by faith apart from works of the law.” If Paul and James are both speaking of class one statements, then we have an absolute contradiction, because the two universals cannot both be true. And then to decide if there is an apparent or formal contradiction between James and Paul, we must correctly identify the type of statement and the place it holds in the mind of the authors.
Thiselton summarizes his understanding of the James/Paul conflict this way: “James is not merely attacking an inadequate view of faith, but is also giving what amounts to a fairly sophisticated and positive account of the logical grammar of his own concept of faith. James is neither merely attacking someone else’s view of faith, nor is he merely saying that faith must be supplemented by works. He is saying that his concept of faith would exclude instances of supposed belief which have no observable backing or consequences in life. In other words, whereas in Paul we see an internal or grammatical relation between faith and justification (because faith is entailed in the very concept of justification for Paul), in James we see an internal or grammatical relation between faith and works, because the very concept of faith entails acting in a certain way” (424).
Both Paul and James' “concept of faith would exclude instances of supposed belief which have no observable backing or consequences in life” (cf. Rom. 6:1-2). Here is the universal that is true in all contexts for both James and Paul. The issue for James is that a “faith” lacking “observable backing or consequences in life” cannot include justification because it is not true. And for Paul true faith cannot exclude justification. There’s no contradiction between the two men but the complexity of faith and the different context being addressed leads to the apparent contradictions.
Benefits/Detriments: I once asked a scientifically minded friend about the mathematics behind an inverse universe. (“For each point in the universe, measure its distance r from the centre of the earth and move the point along the centre-to-point line to a new distance 1/r.” Byl, God and Cosmos, 206.) His comment was, “I think the math works, but it gives me a headache to think about it.” I find myself in a similar situation—I think the philosophy and theology works, but I lack the background in many of the primary and secondary sources.
Having stated this caveat, I know of no better academic overview and critique by an apparently evangelical Christian of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Bultmann. Most of the author’s appropriations from philosophy seem to be helpful. I am a bit apprehensive of Thiselton’s use of Wittgenstein, but I’ve never interacted with Wittgenstein’s writings. I can say the same of his use of Panneneberg, but a bit more emphatically given Panneneberg’s theological outcomes.
It seems to me that many of the philosophical insights of especially Wittgenstein are merely corrections of past philosophical missteps within the Enlightenment tradition. Wittgenstein and Heidegger are both attempting to work within a shared and failing philosophical tradition which is falling apart as the truth of things presses in on it through the observation and criticism of other philosophers. (Both philosophers, especially Heidegger, see themselves as overturning the current system, but I am not convinced it is as fundamental as they believe.) They’ve found some fixes to the leaks, and Thiselton has borrowed some of the elements to defend or allow Christianity. Yet, the older theologians have already done much of this work from a different perspective but with essentially the same outcome. The tools Thiselton provides are helpful but substantial only within the Enlightenment system and the heirs of Enlightenment.
If there is a weakness to Thiselton, it is statements like this, “We cannot put the clock back to the era before Kant” (441). Kant’s insight that we could not “leap outside the confines of our finite or ‘historic’ existence” (27). What Heidegger and Kant apparently mean by this is there can be no sharing or very limited sharing between Paul and the reader, God and reader, and this is simply not exhaustively true. And I doubt that Thiselton believes it is true in the sense of Heidegger or Kant.
I can’t change Paul’s “world,” or his historic existence but Paul can change me. Paul’s horizons are stable and traceable, but my world, my ‘historic’ existence is open to Paul or whomever I am willing to think with. The text changes me, because I come to the text willing to think with the author of the text. I can walk towards the author’s horizons; Paul cannot leap towards me, but he and all great authors anticipate the reader’s limited world, the diverse worlds, and work to fuse the horizons. So Paul writes, “You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will’” (Rom. 9:19), speaking to a reader who does not share his understanding of realty, and he is taking steps to correct it.
To continue expanding beyond the confines of this book review, all reasonably thoughtful authors recognize the two horizons and fight against it. Moses is constantly cajoling and arguing with the Jews that they must remember God’s breaking into history and that their understanding of reality must not revert back to the confines of materialism (cf. Deut.1:27-28) or paganism (cf. 4:3-4;), and that the means of maintaining God’s description is through the text (4:9-10; 6:6-7). And our critic Einstein tells us, “If however the reader despairs of the business of finding his way through Spinoza works, here he will find a reliable guide” (Spinoza Dictionary). Einstein is telling his readers, “My suggestion is that you listen to Spinoza first; see if he speaks to you clearly, and if he doesn’t then fall back on this dictionary. But Spinoza is important so be willing to struggle to understand him.” Moses and Einstein anticipate their readers' needs and their limits and then provide them recommendations and commands. They don’t share the philosophical language and baggage of Enlightenment hermeneutics, because they are simply doing it.
Good readers and good writers anticipate and work with each; the reader anticipates the difficulty of the author’s life situation and abilities and reads accordingly. And the authors anticipate their readers. (And I have said nothing of the Spirit that teaches us.) The study of hermeneutics has the potential of sharpening good readers, perhaps moving a mediocre reader to the good category, but it also has the potential of destroying a good reader and reinforcing the arrogance and errors of the bad reader. The Two Horizons offers to sharpen good readers, correct bad readers, and perhaps challenge the mediocre reader, and in general Thiselton achieves a positive contribution as a Christian within the Enlightenment tradition.
The book is written at a post-graduate level and assumes at least a graduate level knowledge of modern philosophy and theology.